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ABSTRACT
The implications of more environmencal concern for the optimal provision of public
goods, tax structure, environmental policy, and involuntary unemployment are derived within a
second-best framework in which lump-sum taxes and subsidies aze not available and labour
supply is rationed due to a rigid consumer wage. A shift [owazds greener preferences boosts
employment if labour is a better substitute for polluting resources than the fixed factor, the
profit tax is low, and the production shaze of the fixed faaor is large. If initial environmental
concern is small, public consumption may rise as well.
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Luctmer and Sweder van Wijnbergen.1 Introduc[ion
The rapid deterioration of the natural environment and the persistent high levels of
involuntary unemployment are the two main problems facing many western democracies today.
Moreover, falling labour market participation is eroding the financial base of the welfare state in
many countries, thereby threatening the provision of publíc goods. In ordec to address these
issues, various politicians have argued in favour of raising pollution taxes and using the receipts
to cut labour taxes. In this way, they expect to kill three birds with one stone: a cleaner
environment, a reduaion in involuntary unemployment, and a cut in the cost of public funds,
thereby creating more room for public spending.
In previous work we have explored these issues with a cleazing labour market
(Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1992; 1993). We found that a shift towazds greener preferences
reduces rather than expands employment. Employmenc falls even though households and the
government switch from diny co clean consumption commodities and firms substitute clean
faaors of production (including labour) for diny inpuu. The reason is that labour bears the
incidence of environmental taxes. Hence, environmental taxes are implicit taxes on labour. The
opcimal response to more environmental concern involves a rise in public abatement and the
dirt tax, and a fall in the labour tax. If substitution effecu dominate income effects in labour
supply, the swicch from distortionary to non-distortionary taxation reduces the marginal cost of
public funds. This creates more room for public priorities, i.e. a clean envirortment and
provision of traditional public goods.
This paper investigates the robustness of these results to the introduction of involuntary
unemployment. We assume thac involuntary unemployment is caused by a rigid and too high
consumer wage, which is a standard assumption in much of macroeconomic analysis (e.g., Bruno
and Sachs, 1985). Within this framework, the discortion in the labour market is measured by a
virtual tax on labour, which is proportional to the gap between the consumer wage and the
marginal rate of substitucion between private consumption and leisure at the rationed level of
labour supply. The environmental distortion is given by marginal environmental damages due to
the use of polluting inputs.
We extend the literature on optimal taxation in a number of directions. First, we
examine optimal distonionary taxation in the presence of two non-cax distortions, namely wage
rigidities and environmental externalities. Sandmo (1975) investigates optimal taxation with
environmental externalities in the context of a clearing labour market and an exogenous revenue
target. Marchand, Pestieau and Wibaut (1989) analyse optimal taxation in the presence of
rationing on the labour market. We examine how the interattion between environmental
externalities and rationed labour supply affeccs optimal cax structures. Indeed, che tax system
faces the threefold task of raising public revenue, internalising environmental externalicies, and2
combatting involuntary unemployment. Second, we explore the impact of chese market failures
on not only the optimal tax structure but also on the mazginal cost of public funds and the
optimal lcvel o( public spending. In doing so, we integrate wage rigidities and environmental
externalities in the literature on on the optimal provision of public goods in the presence of
distortionary taxation (for a recent survey, see Ballazd and Fullerton (1992)). Third, most of the
literaturc on optimal taxation and public goods merely derives and interpret the first-order
conditions for optimal government policy. We go beyond the characterisuion of first-order
conditions by investigating the comparative statiu of a shift towards greater environmental
concern.
Overall welfare is affected by the quality of the natural environment, public
consumption, and private consumption of both produced commodities and leisure. More
em-ironmental concern yields a'green' dividend in the sense that the quality of the natural
cnvirunmm~[ improvcs. I(, in addition, the level of public consumption rises, we speak of a'red'
dividend. In that case, the overall supply of the public goods (i.e. public consumption and the
quality of the natural environment). increases. Hence, there is a'social' double dividend. The
impact on private welfare can be decomposed into effeas on income from the fixed faaor
('profits') and employment. We define a blue dividend as a rise in profiu'. An increase in
employment yields a first-order effect on private welfare because of the gap between the actual
wage and the reservation wage. The welfare gain associated with an incrrase in employment is
defined as a'pink' dividend. If both environmental quality and employment rise, we speak
about an 'employment' double dividend. There is a'triple' dividend in case a green, red, and
pink dividend occur simultaneously, i.e. if not only the environment benefiu but also public
consump[ion and employment increase. One of the main objeaives of the paper is to explore
the optimal trade-off between the four components of overall welfare (i.e. green, red, blue, and
pink welfare). In particular, we explore under which conditions a double dividend may occur in
the sense that an increase in environmental concern is compatible with a boost to employment
or public consumption or both (i.e. a triple dividend).
Section 2 analyses the behaviour of firms and households and the causes of involuntary
unemployment. Section 3 characterises the optimal public policy, paying particular attention to
the modified Samuelson rule, the optimal tax strutture and the marginal cost of funds. Section 4
derives the general compara[ive statics of more environmental concern. Section 5 explores the
special case of a 100 per cent profit tax, while section 6 discusses the general case. Section 7
concludes with a summary of resulu.
' We call income from the fixed factor 'proGts', but it can also be interpreted as income from land.3
2 Factor demand, labour supply and involuntary unemploymmt
Firms face a concave production function F(L,R) with decreasing returns to scale, where
L represents labour demand and R denotes the use of polluting resources in production. They
maximise profits taking as given the producer wage, w~, and producer resource cost, q~. This
yiehis the following factor demand functions:
L- 1(wr, qr), R-r(we, qr) (14)
where 1„-auaw~-F~hCO, rq-arlaqp-FuIACO and ly~allaqP-I,.iBrlaWp--F~IA with
AsF~F~F~' ~ 0. Hence, for a given producer wage, a higher cost of resources raises the
demand for labour (1910) if the subscitucion effea dominates the output effect. In that case,
resources and labour are non-cooperant factors of produttion (F~ACO).'- Pre-tax profits, II,
follow from II-F(L,R)-w~L-qPR - x(wr,qP) with x---L and x9--R. Profiu are distributed to
households. Private consumption, C, is thus given by C-wLt(1-r)II where w stands for the
consumer wage and r denotes the profit tax rate.
Resources can be bought on the world market for a given price q.' The producer cost
of resources thus amounts to qP ~ q(1tt~, where tR denotes the tax on resources. Imports of
resources must equal exports of final goods, so chat qR - Y-C-G where G denoces the level of
public consumption and Y-F(L,R) stands for the level of output. The government finances
public consumption through revenues from the labour tax, the resource tax and the profit tax,
hence G a tLwLttRqRtrII where tt denotes the wage tax (so thac wPVw(ltt~). Involun[ary
unemployment (i)) is caused by a rigid and too high exogenous consumer wage (w).' Hence,
labour demand determines employment while labour rupply (L~ is rationed. Whereu che
consumer wage is exogenous, the producer wage and thus labour demand are affected by the
~ The Appendix shows that resources and labour are typically cooperant. However, they may be non-
cooperant if these two factors are separable from the fixed factor, the production share of the fixed factor
is large (i.e. labour and resources exhibit strongly decreasing returns to scale), and the substitution
elasticity between labour and resources is large relative to that between the fixed fattor and the labour-
resource composite.
' Alternatively, one can interpret our economy u a closed economy in which the producer prices of
dirty inputs (resources) are fixed by a fixed rate of transformation between dirty inputs and other
(consumpcion) goods.
' This may be justified by efficiency wages. For example, if production is given by Y-f(A(w)L),
where A(w)-(n-~)', OcB~ 1, stands for the efficiency for labour and m~0 denotes the fixed 'outside'
wage, producers set wA'(a-)~A-1. The consumer wage is thus set to w-m~(1-~~ct and output is given
by Y-f(A(rvy(1-~)L)~F(L). Big incentives co recruit, retain, motivate or discipline workers (i.e. a high
value of ~ thus cause high wages and low levels of employment.a
wedge between producer and consumer wages. Environmental damages are an increasing
function of the use of resources. Utility losses on account of environmental damages can thus be
expressed as D(R), D' 10, D"?0. Utility of public consumption can be written as Z(G), Z' ~0,
Z"50. The concave and homogeneous sub-ucility function M(CIN,1-LIN) denotes utili[y of
private consumption and leisure enjoyed by an individual household, where N denotes the
numher ~if households. With chis specification of preferences, social welfare amouncs to:
W- M(C,N-L) t N Z(G) - N D(R). (1)
Notional labour supply (L') corresponds to the hours households would like to work at the
going wage. From the opcimality condition for the mazginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption MN.tIMc-w and the notional budget constraint C-wL't(1-r)II, we obtain
(notional) labour supply as a function of the consumer wage and after-tax profiu,
L'-1'(w,(1-r)II). Figure 1 shows that leisure N-L consists of voluntary unemployment (V ~ N-L~
plus involuntary unemployment (U~L'-L).
3 Optimal public policy
The government selects G, tt and tR to maximise social welfaze, W:
W - M[wl(w(1ttJ,q(ltt~)t(1-r)a(w(ittJ,q(ltc~), N-l(w(1ttJ,q(ltt~)]
t N Z(G) - N D[r(w(1ttJ,q(ltt~)] (2)
subjca tu u given consumcr wage (w) and world price for resourees (q) and taking account of
the government budget constraint
tLW1[w(1ttJ,q(ltt~]t[Rqr[W(lti~,q(1tL~]tTx(w(1ttJ,q(lt[~) - G. (3)
We call p the shadow price of public revenue (in terms of utility). Accordingly, n~~tlMc
denotes the marginal cost of public funds (or the MCPF).
Public consumption follows from the modified Samuelson rule, i.e. the sum of the
marginal rates of substitution between private and public consumption should equal the produa
of the corresponding marginal rate of transformacion (unity) and the MCPF:
NZ' (G)IMc - n. (4)5
Hence, a higher MCPF induces substitution away from public towards private consumption.
The virtual tax on labour (s) and the virtual pollution subsidy (p) measure the
distortions due to, respectively, a rigid consumer wage and pollution externalities. They aze
detined as:
s~(w-w~1wn and p s ND' (R)~qMct) - D' (R)~9Z' (G), (5)
whrrc thc rescrvation wagc (w'reMN.tIM~) atuounts to the marginal ratc of substitution
between private consumption and leisure at the rationed level of labour supply (cf. Neary and
Roberts, 1980). The vircual tax on labour is due to rationing of labour supply and is
proponional to the gap between the exogenous cottsumer wage and the vittual wage (see Figure
1). Thr p~illutinn suhsidy may be intcrpre[ed :ts a virtual subsidy on economic ac[ivi[y, because
producers do not beaz the social costs of environmental damages due to their emissions. This
subsidy is proportional to the sum of the marginal environmental damages of pollution. The
first-order conditions for the optimal tax rate on labour and on resources aze, respectively:
- (1-r)(1 l ll( l
It'4, l- n I Et" (1 'htlJ let.. J
1`tR - I(1 -T)(I -
TIl - eRv 11 ~txlJ 1~a1
(6)
(7)
where the elasticities of factor demand aze defined as Et„~-wpl~lL~O, ERqs-qprq~R10,
EW;-qPl9~L, and Ea„~-wPr,~R. The cross elasticities Ety and ER~ are positive (negative) if the
output (substitution) effea dominates, that is if resources and labour aze cooperant (non-
cooperant) factors of production. If the government can freely adjust the profit tax rate, possibly
above 100 per cenc, che government has in faa access to a lump-sum tax. Accordingly, the
MCPF is unity and raising public revenue does not yield any welfare losses. In that case, the
lirst-best outcomc can br sustained in a decentralised market economy. We, however, focus on a
second-best situation in n-hich the profit tax rate is exogenous.s
If the resource tir cannot be adjusted, the labour tax must be set so as to strike a
balance between three objectives (see expression (6)). First, it must be lazge if public revenue is
' Monitoring problems sssociated with imperfect information may preclude a 100 per cent profit tax
(see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, pp. 467-468).6
scarce, i.e. if che MCPF (q) is high and the profit tax rate (r) is low. For a given MCPF, the
revenue-raising component of the labour tax declines with the wage elasticity of labour demand.
[f che profit tax rate amounts to 100 per cent, the revenue-raising component of the labour tax
vanishes. Intuitively, the labour tax does not raise any net revenue; with a fixed consumer wage,
this tax is borne by profits and thus, wíth a 100 per cent profit tax, by the government.
Second, rationing of labour supply requires a labour subsidy to offset the labour-market
distortion on account of the vinual tax. Just as an explicit labour tax, rationing causes a wedge
between the producer wage (wr) and the vinual wage (w7. A labour subsidy serves to reduce the
gap hciwcen thr soci:d valuc of marginal employment (i.e. wi,) and its marginal cost (i.e. w7.
This subsidy declines with che MCPF (see (5)). If public revenue is scazce, less resources are
available for labour subsidies. Indeed, offsetting the virtual labour tax due co rationing by an
explicit labour subsidy reallocates resources from the public to the private seaor. The cost of
this reallocation rises with the MCPF.
Third, the labour tax affects the use of resources and thus plays a role as an indirect
inscrument to internalise the environmental eacternality. In particular, if the resource tax is set
too low to offset the virtual pollution subsidy (tRG p), labour should be taxed (subsidised) if
resources and labour are cooperanc (non-cooperant) fattors of production. In that case, a labour
tax (subsidy) primazily reduces economic activiry (induces substitution away from resources to
labour), so that the demand for resources and thus environmental damages fall. The labour tax
(subsidy) is used more intensively for this environmental purpose if labour demand is less elastic
with respcct to the product wagc (small ELv).
If che labour tax cannot be adjusted, the resource tax hu to compromise between
internalising the environmental externality, raising revenue, and alleviating the rationing of
labour supply (see expression (7)). In order to fight unemployment (caused by tL~-s), resources
are subsidised (taxed) if resources and labour are cooperant (non-cooperanc) factors of
production, because this raises economic activity (causes substitution away from resources to
labour) and thus boosts employment.
If the government can employ che labour tax and the resource tax simultaneously,
equations (6) and (~ can be solved to yield expressions for the MCPF and the optimal struaure









Wlth EL ~(ELrERq-ELqERv.)I(ERq-ELq) and ER! (ELvERq-ELqERv),(ELw.-ERv). where
EL,,.Eg9E~Eg„~Wp(1~OL.RiO.6 The MCPF rises with the gap between the social benefits and
social costs of additional employment az measured by the sum of the explicit labour tax (tJ and
the virtual tax on labour (s), especially if labour demand is fairly elastic (i.e. if EL in (8) is large).
The MCPF falls with the non-distonionary component of the resource tax aimed at offsetting
the pollution subsidy implicit in the environmental externalities (i.e. p-t~. In an economy
without unemployment and environmental externalities, a small tax does not yield any first-
urder welfare eflects. Hence, the MCPF of the first uttit of public revenues is unity. However,
in the presence of labour-market distortions and environmental externalities, small taxes
generally yield first-order implications for welfare. The reason is that raising revenues may
either exacerbate or alleviate these market imperfections. In partiatlar, the decline in
employment associated with a higher tax level worsens labour-market distortions but, by cutting
pollution, alleviates environmental damages. The MCPF of the first unit of public revenues
exceeds unity if sL-pR~ 0. In that case, the non-distortionary components of the tax system,
which are designed to offset non-tax distortions, yield negative revenue. Raising the first dollar
of revenue yields a first-order welfare loss by worsetung the distortions due to rationing.
Expression (9) shows the optimal structure of the distortionary components of the input
taxes. These distortionary components measure the wedges between the social benefits and costs
of the two inputs. These wedges are affeaed by not only explicit tax rates but also by virtual
tax and subsidy rates. The optimal magnitude of the sum of explicit and virtual tax rates
depends on how sensitive faaor demands are with respea to these wedges. To illustrate, if cross-
` Thr Appendix .omputr, thr varinu. elasticitirs under chree aherna[ive separability assump[ions. it
shuws that ri, and cR arc gcner,tlly positrve. Ilowevcr, q may be negativc il labuw is a much better
substitute for the fixed factor than resources. In that case, the optimal labour tax is negative. Similarly, fR
may be negative if, compared to labour, resources are a much better substitnte for the fixed factor. In that
case, the optimal distottionary component of the dirt tax (tR-p) is negative. By subsidising factors that are
good substimtes for the fixed factor, the government in effect taxes profits. We assume that EL and ER are
not negative. This ensures that the distortionary componenu of both the labour and the resource tax are
non-negative. Concavity of the production function ensures that EL~fRq-fwERy is positive.a
price effects are insignificant, the distortionary component of the labour tax exceeds that of the
resource tax if labour demand is fairly inelastic with respect to the producer wage while
resource demand is fairly elastic with respect to the producer price of resources. In this way, the
government can best tax the fixed factor. Indeed, the government implicitly taxes the fixed
factor by levying the heaviest caxes on factors that are complements or poor substitutes for the
fixed faaor. The pans of the optimal labour and resource tax rates that correa for the labour-
market and environmental distortions are inversely related to the MCPF, because they aze
measured in terms of public revenue (see (5)). Hence, scarcer public funds, as indícated by a
higher MCPF, imply that, ceteris paribus, the optimal tax system focuses more on raising
revenue and less on correcting the labour market distortion or internalising the environmental
externality (cf. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1992).
4 Derivation of the comparative sta[ics results
In order to investigate shocks in preferences for environmental quality, we loglineazise
the conditions describing private behaviour, market equilibrium and optimal government policy.
For this purpose, we denote relative changes by a tilde (e.g. ~,`~dCIC). For the tax races we
define ï;~dt;~(1ttJ, i-L,R, and 3~dr~(1-r). We assume that Z(.) and D(.) aze lineaz, say
Z(G)-y~G and D(R)aryER. Loglineazisation of (4) yields:
n ~ Yc t [~ t ~-~~-L)) ~l (1-~)~a (4~)
where a stauds fur the substitution elasticity between consumption and leisure in private utility
M(.) and ~~McCIM-C~[Ctw'(N-L)] denotes the share of consumption of private
commodities in private utility. Substitution of private consumption for leisure reduces mazginal
utility from private consumption (M~ and thus raises the MCPF sociery is willing to bear
(pz~~M~. Alternatively, a higher MCPF raises the relative cost of public consumption, thereby
crowding in private consumption.
The relative changes in the reservation wage, the virtual tax on labour and the virtual
pollution subsidy are (from (5)):
w' a[~ t(I.~(N-L)) LUo - n~(1-a),
' Ali~.rnrtivcly, une can interprct this 'green' shock as the arrival oF new infurmation about more




A higher MCPF decreues the virtual tax on labour for two reuons. First, a higher MCPF
booscs the virtual wage (w'-MN.[IM~ by reducing marginal utility of private consumption. The
resulting reduction in the labour markec distortion depresses the virtual labour tax. Moreover, a
higher MCPF implies that public resources becomes more expensive. Hence, the gap be[ween
consumer and reservacion wages becomes smaller if ineuured in terms of public revenue. This is
the second reuon why the virtual labour tax, which is measured in terms of public revenue,
falls with che MCPF.







where m,~(1-r)IIy[wL't(1-r)II] stands for the share of after-cax profits in household income.
Since che consumer wage is fixed, only income effects affea notional labour supply. In general,
labour supply declines if after-tax profits rise, i.e. if the labour tax rate falls. However, if all
profits are taxed away, labour supply is fixed.
5 Consequcnces of more environmental concern under a 100 per cent profit tax
If profits are fully taxed away, (6) and (~ reduce to tt--s and tR-p. In this cue,
production efficiency holds; the distortionary componenu of the tax rates are zero. Hence,
labour should be rubsidised rather than taxed in order to offset the virtual tax on labour (s).
Furthermore, the resource tax should equal the virtual pollucion subsidy (p), thereby
internalising pollution externalities. The relative changes in the labour subsidy and the resource
tax aze given by:
(1-s1 t - s, ~1~p1
t
l s 1 t P ll R' 1~.
The modified Samuelson rule (4') and equations (5') and (11) yield the demand curve for
privace consumption goods:Io
C - -
etW1~5sIlNLLI 1PP1lNLLl Ye (12)
where use has been made of the employment equation
s l
L'C'~.~ 1- s1
s -eW 1pP ye. (13)
Since all profits are taxed away (C-wL), equa[ion (13) also corresponds [o the supply curve of
private consumption goods. Hence, we find the optimal change in the labour subsidy:
"s-
( lPp)1 N-L)











The changc in public consumption can be writtcn az:
fJ0 Ci --~ gJ






where mt- wPL~Y, mR ~qPRIY and mo ~G~Y denote the output shazes of, respectively, labour
costs, resource costs and public consumption. Only changes in the labour and resource tax bases
affect public revenue; changes in the labour and resource tax rates do not impact public revenue
due to the induced fall in (taxed) profiu. Intuitively, the labour and resource taxes are shifred
towards profits as the consumption wage and the world price of resources are exogenously
given. Expression (16) reveals that a reduaion in the use of natural resources and an increase in
employment lowers revenue from the resource tax and boosts expenditures on labour subsidies
so that less resources are left for public consumption. Hence, a triple dividend (better
environmen[al quali[y, more employment, and more public consumption) can not occur.
If resources and labour are cooperant factors (i.e. F~ ~ 0 and thus e~~ 0), employmenc
drelines (see (15)). However, public consumption may rise (see (16)). Intui[ively, a higher11
resource tax depresses employmrnt (due to the dominance of the output effect). This reduces
spending on labour subsidirs, [hereby creating room to raise public consumption. The expansion
of puhlic consumption is particululy likely if resource use falls only marginally, so that the base
of thr resource tax is not eroded much. Intuitively, the red component of welfare is not
crowded out because the green component of welfare rises only marginally while the pink
component of welfare falls substancially. A sufficient condition for labour and resources to be
cooperant, and hence for employment to decline, is that the 6xed faaor and labour are
separahlr frnm rrsnurces in pmduction, i.e. Y-F(C~(K,[.),R) where ~ denntes value addrd (srr
Appendix). Alternatively, the fixed faaor and natural resources should be separable from labour
for labour and resources to be cooperant.
If resources and labour are non~ooperant faaors (i.e. FixG 0), environmental quality
improves and employment expands. In that case, the substitution effett dominates the income
effect. Hence, the higher resource tax raises the demand for labour. Higher employment raises
spending on labour subsidies while lower demand for resources reduces revenues from the
resource and profit taxes. Hence, sociery pays for the pink and green dividends in the form of a
fall in public consumption. With a 100 per cent profit tax, private income consists only of
labour income. Accordingly, the private component of social welfare, M, moves in the same
direction as employment and private consumption (M-rlas~-nasZ. `). Hence, also private
welfarc expat[ds in case o[ employment double dividend. Resources and labour may be non-
cooperant if resources and labour aze separable from the fixed factor (see Appendix). Moreover,
the fixed factor should account for a large production share (i.e. ~LtwR small), so that
production exhibits strongly decreasing returns to scale in labour and resources, substitution
between resources and labour is easy, while substirution between the fixed factor and the labour-
resource composite is difficult (see expression (A~ in the Appendix). In summary, if resources
and labour are cooperant factors, a'social' double dividend (i.e. grren and red dividends) may
arise. If these factors are non-cooperant, in contrast, an'employment' double dividend (i.e. green
and pink dividends) emerges. In the latter case, a shift towazds greener preferences reduces
public consumption but raises private consumption and welfare.
I'roposition 1: If all profits are taxed away, a shift towards greener preferences raises the
pollution tax and reduces the use of resources. If labour and resources are cooperant faaors, the
optimal labour subsidy rises while employmenc, output, private consumption and the private
component of social welfare fall. The MCPF declines while public consumption may rise.
However, if resources and labour are non-cooperant factors, the labour subsidy and publicI2
consumption decreue while employment, private consumption, private welfare and the MCPF
increase.
6 Consequences of more environmrntal concern under a grneral profit tax
We now turn to the comparative statics results for the general case under che
assumption that Et and ER remain constant.' If we follow the same procedure as before, we
obtain (4' ), (5') and, instead of (12),
C- I NL~~~et~,ttre~t~tptv P' ane ~0 (17)
111 (I -a)(1 ~tt) `ell1-a)qstw'Iw1)
where E~EtI(I-T). The second term at the right-hand side of (17) (i.e. pïJ captures the positive
effect of a higher labour tax on the MCPF, thereby moving the composition of aggregate
demand towards private and away from public consumption. This effect is partícularly large if a
high rla,tiriry nf ,uhctitwi~~n hrrween consumprirtn and lei~ure (a) makrs priva[e consumption
rather sensitive to the the MCPF - see (4' ). However, the impact on the MCPF is weakened by
the associated downward pressure on the virtual tax on labour - see the second term in the
numerator of the expression for p. The first term at the right-hand side of (17) reveals that a
higher labour tax depresses labour demand and thus raises leisure and, therefore, the demand for
private consumption.
The optimal structure of factor taxation (9) yields, upon substitution of the expression
for' s in (5') with n-(1-r~)pïtla and p-" ryE, the relative change in che resource tax:
et. (I'tie) ~R - pYetx~~. x3
~II a~~e`~s.lw(1 .a)1
~o.
The resource tax rises with more environmental concern. The labour tax also raises the optimal
resource tax. Intuitively, the government finds it optimal to spread the tax burden over labour
and resources. The positive effect of the labour tax on the resource tax is weakened by the
negative effect of the labour tax on the virtual tax on labour (s) on account of the usociated
ultwarJ ~trrsiurr tm thr M~PF,
Substitntion of (13) into (17) yields the demand curve for private consumption:
' The Appendix presents three special cases for which Et and ER are constant. In the cases that Et and
Ea are not constant, our results on compantive statics hold only approximately.13
~ - [Pt(ELrfXEt~L~~-L)) tt t EtqP[Ly(N-L)I Ye. (19)
We assume that the demand curve slopes upwards (see Figure 2), i.e. that xe~ is not too large in
absolute value and negative. A higher wage tax raises private consumption by raising the MCPF,
thereby making public consumption more expensive. However, it reduces employment, thereby
raising leisure demand and thus private consumption.
Loglineazisation of the household budget, C-wLt(1-r)II, yields:
!J~ l. - ~4![I(1tC~I L - (1-r) (lJl. tL f !JR t~. (20)
Upon substitution of labour demand and (18) into (20), we arrive at the supply curve for privaze
consumption:
[JCI.- ~(1-T)(JA t(WtI(1 t CJ)EIqJPÏE~(1-r)(47I. t 41p)() t ((Ot~(1 t CJ)(EL. f Etqi)J` L~ (21)
The supply curve slopes upwards (see Figure 2). A higher labour tax raises the total tax burden,
which is fully born by the fixed faaor. Hence, profit income declines. The higher labour cax
also depresses labour income by reducing labour demand. Both effects reduce private
consumption. A greater concern with environmental damages shifu the supply curve
downwards. Intuitively, the government can charge a higher price for the environment, which is
publicly owned. This creates more room for more public spending at the expense of private
consumption.
We can solve for ~ and it from (19) and (21). Equation (18) then gives ia, so that í.--
(ECvtttElqt~, IJ-R--(EAqLRtER~LJ, ]'Í--fJ~L1-taRCR and M-(cx~i.r~[(~c.~(itl~)nsL-(1-r)ÍÍ] can be
computed. The resulu of these computations are presented in Table 1. Note that with a 100 per
cent profit tax rate (r-1), we have ~L-(1ttJ~c and eyao upon which Table 1 reduces to the
results derived in section 5. We now discuss Che general comparative statics results presented in
Table 1.
6.1 The resource taz, the labour tax, and the cost of publicjunds
Table 1 shows, not surprisingly, that a shift towards greener preferences always raises
the optimal resource ta.e. A sufficient condition for more environmental concern to reduce thela
labour tax rate is that resources and labour are cooperant factors of produaion." If not all
profi[s are taxed away, a higher resource tax tax reduces private consumption by raising the
total tax burden, thereby depressing profit income. In addition, the higher resource cax depresses
labour demand (if e~ ~ O) and thus labour income. The fall in private consumption and the rise
in leisure raises marginal utility from private consumption. The government thus finds it
op[imal to reduce the labour tax race in order to prevent private consumption from declining
too much. If the wage elasticity of labour demand (et„) is small, the labour tax is relatively
ineffective in raising consumption by boosting the demand for labour. Hence, the labour tax has
to fall substantially. If the profit tax rate is small, the higher tax burden on resources is mostly
borne by private consumption. Accordingly, the labour tax has to fall significantly to protect
private consumption. The fall in the labour tax is thus particularly large if the wage elasticity of
labour demand and the profit tax rate are small. Under chese circumstances the fall in the
MCPF is also substancial.
If the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the resource price (e~ is large, the rise
in the resource tax exeru substantial adverse effecu on labour demand and private income.
Consequently, the labour tax rate must fall substantially to stem the fall in private consumption.
If consumption and leisure aze poor substirutes (i.e. o and thus p are small), the resource tax
rises by only a small amount. In that case, more leisure due to lower employment and less
private consumption on account of a higher tax burden raises marginal utility from private
consumpcion. This expands the demand for private conrumption, thereby curtailing the rise in
the overall tax burden on account of a lower MCPF.
6.1 Employment
Even if resources and labour are on the borderline of being cooperant and non-
cooperant factors of production (i.e. ety-0), more environmental concern expands employmeat,
as long as not all profit income is taxed away (rC I).'o Figure 2 shows that the tax rate on
labour falls, which boosts employment. Despite the cut in labour costs, profit income falls on
account of the higher resource costs. This depresses private consumption even thougó labour
income rises. More generally (i.e. e~ not zero), che 'employment' double dividend becomes
more likely, the lower the profit tax rate, the larger the production share of the fixed factor,
' Section 5 discussed the c.ue in which factors are aontooperant md the profit tax rate is 10096.
Table 1 shows that the (negative) labour tax increases in this case. Indeed, section S showed that, if
resources and labour are non-cooperant factors of production and the profit tax rate is 100~,, the labour
tax rate rises, i.e. the labour subsidy falls, and the MCPF rises (cf. Proposition 1).
'o The sign of e[~-cR„ corresponds to that of eR, which is non-negative.15
J
antl thc largcr thc substitution possibilitics bctwcen labour and resources arc." Thcse thrce
factors make it easier to shift the costs of the green dividend usociated with a higher
environmental tax to the fixed factor rather chan to labour (in the form of less employment).
The important role of fixed factors suggests that an 'employment' double dividend is more
likely in the short than in the long run, becausc in the short run more fattors are fixed.
Consider a situation in which labour and resources are separable from the fixed faaor.
In that case, a pink dividend requires a lot of rubstitution pouibilities between labour and
resources (i.e. Et~ER~~aix lazge, see Appendix) and only little substitution between the fixed
faaor and the labour-resource composite (i.e. aH and thus E~ small, see Appendix). Hence,
labour should be a much better substitute for resources than the fixed factor. This implies that
labour substitutes for resources, thereby making produaion more labour intensive. At the same
time, production does not fall substantially as the fixed faaor is a poor substitute for resources.
Indeed, as a poor subscitute for resources, the fixed factor beazs much of the burden of the
additional resource tax. If substitution between labour and resources is excluded, more
environmental concern always reduces employment (as EL.-ERv~0ix~0 and EtyZO if aix-0, see
Appendix).
If resources and the iixed factor are sepazable from labour in production, resources and
labour are always cooperant factors (E~-o~~~t.yt20, see Appendix). Nevertheless, an
'employment' double dividend is possib~if substitution between the fixed factor and resources
is difficult while substitution between labour and the other two factors is relatively euy (oan
small relative to a1 so that Et,;ER,, is large while E~ is small, see Appendix). Clearly, for a pink
dividend to occur, the fixed faaor needs to bear a large part of the burden of the higher
resource tax. This requires the fixed fattor to play an important role in production (t.~ large), to
be a poor substitute for resources, and to face a low profit tax.
If resources and labour aze cooperant, consumption and leisure should be poor
substicutes (i.e. a and thus p small) for the pink dividend to occur. In that case, a fall in the
MCPF, associated with a larger non-distortionary component of the resource tax, produces only
a small rise in the overall tax burden u marginal utility of privue consumption rises rapidly
with falling consumption and employment. The relative small rise in the tax burden prevenu a
decline in employment.
" The Appendix shows that a higher production share of the fixed factor reduces the term ew in the
numerator of the entry for employment in Table 1. Large substitution possibilities between labour and
resources raise the term Et~Ea~ and reduce the term EW, thercby increasing the numerator of the entry for
employment in Table 1.16
Proposiliun 2: I~.vrn if rr,~~urrrs .tnd lahnur arr r~~~iprrant factors, more envimnmental cnncern
may boost employment. In particular, employment rises if the profït tax rate is low, the
production share of the fixed factor is large, labour is a better substitute for resources than the
fixed factor, and consumption and leisure ue poor substitutes in utility.
6.31'rofts, notional labour supply and involuntary unemployment
The absolute value for the entry (1-r)fÍ in Table 1 measures the overall tax burden. The
total tax burden rises (az we azsume that Etv-eRv is non-negative). Ic rises substantially if the
profit tax rate is small, the share of resources in production (e,t~ is large, labour is a better
substitute for resources than the fixed faaor (i.e. E~,.-ER~ luge), and substirucion between leisure
and consumption is easy (o and thus p large).
Expression (10) shows that a fall in profit income raises notional labour supply. Hence,
the notional labour supply curve ia Figure 1 shifts out, thereby raising involuntary
unemployment, U, and reducing voluntary unemployment, V. The conditions for involuntary
unemployment to fall are thus more stringent than the conditions for employment to rise.
6.4 Private consumption andprivate weljare
Private consumption typically declines due to a rise in the total tax burden, which
depresses profit income. The fall in private consumption is particularly large if employment
expands. The reason is twofold. Firsc, a boost to employment requires that the fixed faaor bears
the burden of the higher resource tax, thereby deptessing profit income. Second, a higher level
of employment reduces leisure. A lower level of leisure reduces the marginal utility of priviate
consumption, thereby decreasing the optimal level of private consumption (see the modified
Samuelson rule (4' )). The Grst effect is important if the profit taz rau is low while the latter
effect is particularly strong if leisure and private consumption are poor substitutes.
Private consumption may rise if the profit tax rate is large and resources and labour are
non-cooperant factors of production. With a high profit tax, a large share of the fixed factor is
owned by the government. Hence, the burden of higher tax rates is borne by the government
while private consumption benefits from higher labour income due to the expansion of
employment (see also section 5). The private component of welfare (i.e. Ivt) typically 'pays' for
the cleaner environment. However, if resources and labour are noncooperant factors (Eta G 0),
private welfare may rise if the profit tax rate is large (see section 5). In that case, there is a
private as well as a green dividend.17
6.5 Environmental qtrality
Resource use is cuc back, so that environmental quality improves. There aze three effects
on the demand for resources: (i) fall in demand on account of a higher overall tax burden
(measured by pER~; (ii) substicution between resources and the fixed factor (measured by
E[~ERqE~ER~) ; and (iii) substitution between labour and resources on account of the change in
the relative input prices (measured by ERy-ER„). The first effea represents the decline in
employment and output (and hence emissions) due to substitution between leisure and private
consumption in utility. A large value for the substitution elasticity between leisure and
consumption (which corresponds to a large value for p) boosts the improvement in
environmental qualicy. The reason is [hat reducing emissions by decreuing output, and hence
employment and consumption, is relatively cheap if leisure is a good substirute for con-
sumptinn. The second e(fect stands for the substitution between resources and the fixed factor.
This effect also depresses the level of output. Finally, the third term represenu the substirution
between labour and resources due to the lower labour tax and the higher resource tax. In con-
trast to the other two effects, this latter effea accomplishes a better quality of the environment
through a cleaner composition rather than a lower level of output.
6.6 Public consumption
Public consumption is likely to rise if resource demand does not decline much or if the
initial tax rate on resources is small. Intuitively, the increase in green welfare should be either
cheap (i.e. if the initial tax rate is small) or small (if resource use declines only marginally).
Indeed, if resource use does not fall much, pollution caxation is a poor instrument for
improving environmental quality but a splendid device for generating public funds.
The substitution elasticity between leisure and private consumpcion of commodities is
another determinan[ of the effect on public consumption. In particulaz, public consumption is
likely to rise if a large value for this elasticity (and hence for p) makes the level of private con-
sumption rather sensitive to the MCPF. In that case, the decline in the MCPF on account of a
larger non-distortionary component of the resource tax produces a substantial rise in tax rates.
I'his yirlds a large rise in public revenues as long as the Laffer curve slopes upwatds on account
of small tax rates or small elasticities.''
If the initial resource tax and profit tax rates are small, easy substitution between labour
'- Por the Laffer curve to slope up~-ard, the profit tax rue must be smaller than 100 96. The
importance of the initial tax rates indicates that public consumption is unlikely to expand if public
consumption is large initially.18
and resources in production is likely to raise public consumption. One reason is that the
associated substitution of labour for resources tends to decrease leisure. This reduces the optimal
level of private consumption, thereby leaving more room for the public sector. If the tax rate
on labour is positive, another channel through which easy substitucion between labour and
resources boosts public consumption is the expansion of the base of the labour tax. However,
substitution between labour and resources may reduce public consumpcion if the initial tax rate
on resources is high. In that case, the erosion of the bue of the resource tax due to the lower
demand for resources has substantial adverse consequences for public revenues. Through this
channel of che erosion of the resource-tax base, substitution between resources and the fixed
factor tcnds to rcducc public consumption.
Proposition 3: If the own price elasticity of resource demand is small, labour is a better
substituce for resources than the fixed factor, substitution in utility between consumption and
leisure is strong, and the initial tax rates on resources and profiu ue small, more environmental
concern is likely to raise public consumption.
6.7 Green, pink, red and blue
To analyse whether double or even triple dividends ue possible, we analyse the marginal
changes in the vuious componenrs of social welfaze. Converàng muginal welfue changes in[o
dollus (by dividing through the muginal utility of private consumption) and expressing them as
fractions of national income, we obtain:
~ ~ dW dM ~ Z dG t-D dR - n s ~LL i~(1-c)iI~
McY - McY McY McY (1 atL
f ln~lt~ J
~LL'rl~l~J
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where the cerms in the square brackets on the right-hand side contain the pink, blue, red and
green dividends, respectively. The red dividend may, alternatively, be viewed u the tax burden
as measued by colleaed tax revenue. A decline in profit income boosu the red dividend, but
deteriorates the blue component of welfare. A rise in employment raises the labour tar base
and, if the tax rate on labour is positive, contributes to the red dividend. With involuntary
unemployment (as measured by the virtual tax on labour due to rationing, s), a rise in
employment concributes also to the pink dividend. Upon substitution of (8), (22) becomes:
dW~McY - (1-r)(n-1) I(WL~E~Lt(wRle,~it-fil. ('-3)19
Given eR 10, the resource tax esceeds the virtual pollution subsidy (ta~ p) so that the
distortionary component of the resource tax is positive. Since the social benefit of additional tax
revenue more than offsets the social coscs due to additional environmental damage, a higher
level of resource use enhances w.elfare at the margin. Hence, cutting back pollution depresses
social welfare. Similarly, given ec10, the distortionary tax on labour, which unouna to the
sum of explicit and vinual taxes, exceeds zero. Hence, raising employment contributes to
welfare at the margin.
The lefr-hand side of (23) is zero, because we start from an optimal tax and expenditure
system. Hence, given ec,eR~ 0, a green dividend (i.e. }~C 0) can occur only if either employment
or profits (or both) fall. Setting the left-hand side of (22) equal to zero, we obtain an expression
for the red dividend:
~
MY -
-n(is~ ~LL ~ q(PR1taRR - (1-c)iI. (24)
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Compared to expression (16) for the case with a 100 per cent profit tax, expression (24)
includes an additional term representing the change in after-tax income from the fixed factor
(i.e. the last term at the right-hand side of (24)). This additional term makes a triple dividend
possible in which the green, red and pink components of welfare all rise. In that case, the fixed
factor (i.e. blue welfaze) bears all costs of the additional social priorities (i.e. additional
employment, higher public consumption, and improved environmental qualiry). For a[riple
dividend to occur, initial environmental concern must be small (i.e. p small), so that a better
quality of the environment is cheap. As far as the produaion structure is concerned, labour
must be a good substitute for resources. This ensures that the demand for labour rises, thereby
providing a pink dividend. The expansion of employment contributes to a red dividend also by
reducing leisure, thereby decreasing the demand for private consumption and leaving more
room for the puhlic sector.
In contrast to labour, the fixed factor should be a poor rubstitute for resources for a
triple dividend to occur. This in order to prevent that a large drop in the demand for resources
would ernde the base of the resource tax. Another condition for a triple dividend to occur is
that the production shaze of the fixed factor is large and the profit tax small so that after-tax
income accruing to the fixed fattor is large. Only in that case is the fixed fattor able to absorb
the costs associated with the additional social priorities.
If we start from an undistorted equilibrium with no involuntary unemployment (s-0),
no initial concern for the environment (p-0), and a profit tax of less than 100 per cent (rC 1),
public consumption typically increases. The incre.ue in the size of the public seaor correspondszo
to a decline in aher-tax profits on account of a rise in the tax burden associated with a fall in
the MCPF. Starting from a situation of widespread involuntary unemployment but only small
environmental concern (i.e. large s and low p), the government is likely to reap a triple dividend
if employment rises. The reason is that the costs of additional employment are borne by the
fixed factor (in the form of a higher tax rate) rather than by the government budget. If initial
environmental concern is high, however, a shift towards even greener preferences is likely to
reduce public consumption. Intuitively, the costs of a higher provision of the public good of the
environment is borne by the other public good, i.e. public consumption.
Proposition 4: For a triple (green, red and pink) dividend to occur, initial environmental
concern must be small. At the same time, the fixed factor must account for a lazge production
share while the profit tax should be low. Moreover, substitution between resources and the
fixed factor should be difficult. Substitution between resources and labour, in contrast, should
be easy.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated various second-best claims about the impaa of more
ambitous environmental policies on involuntary unemployment and the costs of fmancing
public goods. If profits are taxed away and labour and resources are cooperant factors, the
labour subsidy rises while employment, output, private consumption and the private component
of social welfare fall. However, if resources and labour are non-cooperant, the labour subsidy
falls while employment, private consumption and privace welfaze rise and public consumption
declines. If not all profits are taxed away, employment may rise even if resources and labour are
cooperant faccors of production. For employment to rise, labour must be a better substitute for
resources than the fixed factor of production, the profit tax rate must be low, and the
production share of the fixed factor should be large. Hence, employment rises only if it is
possiblc to shift a large proportion of the burdcn of a cle:tner environment to the Eixed factor.
However, che fall in profic income raises nocional labour supply. Hence, involuntary
unemployment may rise even if employment expands.
Mcire environmental concern is usociated with more public consumption if tax rates on
resources and profics are low while other inputs are poor substitutes for resources in production,
and consumption and leisure are good substitutes in utility. With easy substitution in utility, the
fall in the cost of public funds raises cax rates substantially by inducing a large reallocation away
from private consumption. With low initial tax rates and poor substitution in production, thezl
erosion of the base of the resource and profit ta.ees does not yield lazge adverse effects on public
revenues. Consequently, revenues rise, thereby creating room for more public consumption.
Flowever, if initial tax rates are high, i.e. the public sector is large, a shift towards greener
preferences is likely to depress public consumption, especially if the fixed factor is a better
subscitute for resources chan labour. In that case, higher tax rates erode the tax base and
employment is likely to fall. Income from the fixed factor typically declines, thereby depressing
private consumption and private welfare. Private consumption and the private component of
utility rise only if the profit tax rate is high and labour and resources aze non-cooperant faaors
of production, e.g. if resources and labour are good substicutes for each other but not for the
fixed factor.
If the initial equilibrium is chazaaerised by much concern for the environment,
additional environmental policy is expensive. Hence, a green dividend crowds out not only blue
welfare but also red welfare (i.e. other public goods). If, in contrazt, the initial situation features
little environmental concern, a shift towazds greener preferences may yield both a green and a
red dividend. In that case, a triple dividend of more employment, less pollution and more public
consumption at the expense of profits may emerge if labour is a becter substirute for resources
than the fixed factor. This may be exactly what various green left-of-centre politicians on both
sides of the Atlantic have in mind. Such a triple dividend, however, requires that fixed faaors
play an important role in production. This is unlikely to be the case in the long run and in
open economies - especially as economic integration proceeds.
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Appendix: Futor demand elasticities
This appendix analyses the implications of three separability conditions on the production
function for the factor demand elasticities. The fixed factor, say H, haz price pH. We calculate the factor
demand elasticicies at a given level of the fixed factor (nther than at a given level of output). Production
displays constant returns to scale with respect to L, H and R, so that the zero-profit condition becomes:
WH PH t WL WP 4 WA qP - O, WHtWL}WA-1. (AS)
We assume in each caze a sub-production function Q(.) with price index pQ, a.hich also exhibiu constant
returns to scale. Firat, consider the sepanble production function Y-F(Q(H,L),R). Profit maximisation
yields QLIQH-wPIPHi so (with li-0):
L- ~- n - QLH IY'H " wP) (AZ)
where oLHShcog(LIH)Idlog(QHIQ~ denotes Allen's substitution elasticity for H and L in Q(.). Using
(Al) to eliminate pH in (A2), we find labour demand with the following elasticities:
fL,. - ou1(1-WA)IWH 2 0 and eLq - oLHWAIWH z 0. (A3)
Homogeneity of Q(.) implies (making use of (A1):
(I-WA) ~- WL L and (1~ pQ - WH PH t W. wr -- 4k qP. (A4)
Profit maximisation, i.e. FAIFQ-qPIpQ, yields:
~ - Q - oR (PQ - 9P) - - oR ~(1-W!J (AS)
where oA stands for Allen's substitution elazticity for Q and R in F(.). Substitution of (A3) and (A4) into
(A5) yields the elasticities for the demand for natural resources:
WL




2 0 and eR„ - o~ ~ z 0.
WH
(A6)
Hence, if labour and the fi~ed factor are separable from resources, labour and resources are cooperant
factors of production. For this case we have eL.EAw-ULHZI), fAyfLq-(QR-fJAO~I(1-fJ~, ER-OAIWH~O, and
fL - aLHaR(1-WR]I ~W hl(00.~0.QLH])'
Second, if resources and the fixed factor are sepanble from labour, i.e. Y-F(Q(R,H),L), labour
and resources are cooperant factors az well. The expressions for the factor demand elasticities are
EL.~-~~LtaRH(WLWRIWN)Y(1~L~~ fLq-aRHWRIWH~Qr ERq-a0.H(1-WJIWH and fR.-aRHWLIWH2O. Hence, fOr
Ch15 case We have fL-QLIWH~O, fRq-ELq-QRH~~i ELv-fRv-(QL-WL~RH)I(1-WL) and23
ER-aRMQL(1-~t]~l~n(aL~LOR~], where at stands for Allen's substitution eluticity for Q and L in F(.).
Finally, consider the case in which labour and resources are sepanble From the fixed factor, i.e.
Y-F((~(L,R),[-í). A similar prncedure yields the labour demand elasticities
eLW-~~~H~~L'o~~R~`~L'~AI'O' w-~~~H~-o~~~~L ~R~
(AÍ)
and the resource demand elasticicies
~ ~n t 1 0 ~t
- aH~~H~ a~~L~~L~~R~' ~- x ~~A~~
(A8)
where oFi stands (or Allen's substitution elasticity for Q and H in F(.) and au for the eluticity of
substitution associated with L and R in Q(.). The condition for L and R to be coopennt factors of
production is that oH is large while atR and the share of the fixed factor in production (~~ are small.
Conversely, the condition for labour and resources to be non-cooperant faaors is that au and the share
of the fixed factor in production are large while aH is small. In genenl, we have ft,-Ey„-ERy-Ety-a~z0.
Since ri-rR-a~~~~ii, the taxes nn factors of production mttct satisfy (tR-p)I(ltt~-(t;ts)I(ltq) (see (8)
.tnJ (7)). 'I'hc sperial easc ul a(;ubb-Uouglas production lunction, Le. UL0.-an-I, gices et--(1-~~~mH,
ERq-(1-41J~41H, E~-41R~41H and ER„-41tI4)H s0 C}taC ftr~Rv-ERq-f~-1.
Summarising, we find three cues in which EL and ER in (8) are constant:
(i) No substitution between labour and the fixed factor and these factots ue sepanble from resources.
Hence, atH-0 and thus Et--E~-O so that Et-0, tR-p and p-1 in (8) and (9). Since substitution becween
the fixed factor and labour is impossible, the government unnot do anything about the labour market
distortion. Hence, the labour tax (t~ simply adjusu to raise the required amount of public revenue. In
fact, u employment is fixed, the labour tax can be shihed towards profit.c. Hence, the labour tax can raise
public revenue without any excess burden. Consequently, the MCPF is unity.
(ii) No substitution between resources and the fixed factor and these factors ue sepanble from labour in
production. Hence, ORH-O and [hUS ERq-ER--E~-O so that ER-0, tt--s and q-1 in (8) and (9). There is
thus a labour subsidy while the MCPF is unity. In this cuq the resource tax nther than the labour tax
adjusts to raise the required amount of public revenue. The resource tax can thus not be adjusted to fight
pollution. There is no welfare cost usociated with using the resource tax to raise revenue, since the use of
resources is inelastic and the burden of taxation is entirely borne by profits.
(iii) Production is sepanble in labour and resources on the one hand and the fixed factor on the other
hand and, furthermore, the eluticity of substitution between the fixed factor and the labour-resource
composite is unity (i.e. aH-1). This implies that Et-ER-1~~H with tvH constant.Figure 1: Rationing in the labour mazke[
wage (w)
virtual wage (w~
Note: The virtual tax on labour due to rationing of labour supply, s-(w-w~~w~, causes
involuntary unemployment, U.




tax rate on labour (t~
Note: If the demand for labour does not depend on the cost of resources (i.e. e~-0) and not all
profits are taxed away, an increase in environmen[al concern shifts E to E', [hereby reducing
che [ax rate on labour, expanding employment and depressing private consumption.Table L Implications of more rnvirnnmental concern (y~.)
ÍZCSOLLCCC CáX ~~ pt(1-T)(wL,wJtKEL~. i Q
Labour tax (i~ {KE~ t (1-r)wR~wc]
MCPF (n) {KEIy t (1-T)wRlw~;] p(1-a)~a
Employment (' L) -PE~ t (EL~ER„)(1-T)wR~wc
PfOfILS ((1-T)~ -(1-T) [p t K(EIv~Rv)] wR 5 0
Private consumption (wcZ`) -p[(wL~(1ttJ)E~t(1-r)wR]-(EL~ERM)(1-r)wR[L~(N-L)]
Private utility (wcM~a) -P[(wLI(1tLJ)El,ynst(1-r)wR]
- (ELr-ERv)(1-T)wR [1~ `"-I-))t(1-~S)wL~(1tLL]]
Public consumption (w~~i) p[wR(1-T)-(LL~(lt[J)wLE~-(LRI(StL~)wRE~] t
(EL.: ERv) (1-T)wR [l~ l~ `"I-)) t wl.,w~
- (LRI(1t2~)wR
[(E~-E~(wL~(1 tLJw~(1-T) i-K(ELvERq~lqERv)]
Pollution (y' ~) - pEftq - K(ELvERq-ELqER..)- (ER9-Elq~(1-T)(WL~(1 tLJw~
Note: Logarithmic deviations in endogenous variables are entries shown times pyE~p'.
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